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Exit Discrimination in Major League 
Baseball: 1990-2004 
Peter A. G roothuis· and James Richard Hill t 
Using a p<l1lcl study of annual Major League Baseball (M LB) data (1990- 2004). we do not find 
evidence that race alTeets the career duration of black hitters. Our findin gs arc inconsistent with 
results from a study by liobu (1988) who used 1971 - 1985 data that found that race dl'Creased 
career length. ('('/('f;S p(lribllS. for bhLck hitters but not Hispanics. The dilTerence in resu lts could 
be due to our use of seasonal-variant data: Jiobu used only career st(uist ics in his rcsearch. 
Another interpretat ion of the ditTering results is that market competition overcame 
discrimination. This cou ld be interpreted as an affirmation of Becker's theoretical work on 
discrimination. Our results for pi tchers also do not indicate ,my exit diserimin(uion against the 
minority groups . 
. JEL Classification: J71, L83 
I. Introduction 
The topic of discrimination in labor markets has allractcd a great deal of research by 
economists over time. From the theoretical constructs developed by Becker (1971) to the 
development of the residual method by Oaxaca ( 1973), economists have struggled 10 determine 
the cause and elTecls of prejudice on minority workers. Professional sports havc provided a 
fertile field fo r resea rchers of this topic because of the abundance of performance data and 
sala ry information lL vailable. In Kahn's (199 1) a rt icle on discrimination in professiona l sports. 
he reviews empirical findings from numerous articles published between 1972 and 1989. He 
divides his su mmaries under four major headings: sala ry discrimination. posit ional 
discrim ination. customer discrimination. and hiri ng discrim ination. Many of the articles 
olTered findings on more than one of the topic head ings, 
Sa lary discrimination drew the most attention. Twenty·four articles with empirical work 
on this topic arc critiqued by Kahn (1991): 12 on baseball . eight on basketbiLll. and two each on 
football and hockey. The st rongest evidence of salary discrimination against black athletes 
comes from studies of the National Basketball Association (N BA) based on data from 1984-
1986. However. more recent research (Bodva rsson and Brastow 1999: Hill 20(4) has failed to 
find sa lary discrimination in the NBA using data from the 1990s. Twelve articles involving 
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research on posi tional segregation were reviewed (Kahn 1991): five from baseball, three from 
football, two from bilsketba ll. and two from hockey. Evidence suggested positional segregation 
o r stacking existed fo r blacks in baseball and foot ball: evidence also suggested that blacks were 
underrepresented at the center and forward positions in the N BA. Customer discri mination was 
the main or auxiliary focus in 15 of the papers (Kahn 1991): nine from basketball and six from 
baseball. Results are mixed for ilttendance at NBA gnmes: a recent imide (Kanazawa and 
Funk 2ool) finds a negati ve corrdation between the percenwge of bliu,:ks on the roster and 
cable TV ratings. In basebalL evidence from mid-1970s revenue data fails to find customer 
discrimination, but studies using earl ier data did . Customer discrimination also appears 10 exist 
in the baseball trading card market (Nardinelli and Simon 1990). 
Of the 13 pieces of empirical work focused on hiring discrimination reviewed by Kahn 
(1991). six deal wi th data from baseball, four with basketbalL two with hockey, and one with 
football. Findings failed to confirm hiring barriers for black at hletes in basketball and baseball; 
whites with inferior performances were not hi red over superior black ath letes. However. 
Johnson and Marple ( 1973) found evidence from 1970- 1971 NIlA data that marginal white 
players had longer careers than marginal black players. Hoang and Rascher (1999) explored the 
concept of racia lly based retention barriers in the NBA in more dewi l using data from the 
1980s. They. too. found evidence that. holding performance constant. there was "exit 
discrimination" in the NBA. Groothuis and Hill (2004) failed to confirm Honng and Rascher's 
results using more recent data, height liS an added explan,nory variable. and a duration model 
that a][O\~'ed for both stock and now samples. 
Jiobu (1988) found evidence that race decreased career length, cerer;.\' paribus. for black 
players but not Hispanics using Major League Baseball (M LB) data from 1971- 1985. The 
purpose of this article is to determine if Jiobu's findings can be replicated using more recent 
baseball data and a richer duration model that has seilson-vari,mt data: Jiobu used only 
unchanging. cllrcer performance v:lri:lbles in his model. Exit discriminllt ion is more subtle than 
positional segrega tion or pay discrimination. If exit discrimination in M LB is no longer present. 
it wou ld seem \0 "ffirm Becker's theoretical implications that market competition will eliminate 
discrimination over time. 
2. T heory 
Discri mination in the labor m:lrket implies thilt certain individuals or groups of workers 
are somehow treated diITerently than others unrelated to ability o r performance: in the 
literature on professional sports. the focus has been on diITerenti,11 treatment of black. 
Hispanic, and French-Canadian players. The diITerent;al treatment can occur in a variety of 
formats. When pay discrimination occurs. workers in the grou p receiving the unequal treatment 
receive lower pay than others for the slime pcrfonmUlce level. Most researchers believe pay 
discrimination against black players in professional baseball was eventually elimina ted by free 
agency and salary arbitration in the mid·[970s (Hill ,lI1d Spellman 1984; Cymrot 1985). 
Research by Johnson (1992) even suggests that white plilyers earn less than black players of 
simi lar ability on teams that have fewer black players. 
HOling ,md Rascher ( 1999) defi ne exit discrimination :IS "the involuntary d ismissal of 
workers based on the preferences of employers, coworkers, or customers" (pp. 69- 70). Jiobu 
576 Peler A. GrOOlllllis (111(/ JUI/U'S Richard Hill 
(1988) and Hoang and Rascher (1 999) concluded that career lengths for black pla yers in MLB 
and the N BA. respeeti\'cly. were lower than those of their white coun terparts. Cl'll'ri~' p{jribll.~. 
While Jiobu docs not make ;IIlY calculations on the impact of cxit discrimination 011 career 
earnings. Hoang and Rascher conclude th;1t this form of discrim ination led to an almost two 
and a half times greater decrease in black career pay compared with the more heavily analyzed 
form of pay di scrimination . 
Becker (1971) suggests that thc sou rce of the personal prej udice that leads to various forms 
of labor market discrimination ma y be em ployers. coworkers. o r customers. Recent resea rch by 
Kallll and Sherer (1988) on pay discriminat ion in the N BA and Hoang and Rascher (1999) on 
exit discriminat ion in the N BA has focused on customers as the source of the prejudice: bOlh 
studies fo und empirical evidence 10 support the existence of customer discrimination. The pay 
premium for white pla yers WllS explained by the higher value of thei r performances compared 
wilh black players because of the prejudiced preferences of whitc. majority fans. 
Hoang and Raschcr (1999. p. 74) hypot hesized: ' "To sa tisfy thc f;llls. there is a minimum 
number of white players on a team. The second assumpt ion. that the pool of quality avail<lble 
talent is becoming increllsingly black. causes annual replacement of players with rookies 10 
occur mostly among black players. The white players have longer careers simply beca use there 
lire fcwer qUlllified white rookies to replace them ..... 
[n his study of exit discrimi nation in ML B. Jiobu (1988. p. 532) does not specificil lly test 
for customer discrimination. but he docs state: ·· Perhaps. motivated by the concern that white 
fans will not support a predominan tly black tcarll. managemcnt ha s silent[y pl:lced an 'in visible 
ceiling' on the black percentage. When coupled with the desire to have a winning team. this 
ceiling would genera te strong pressures to (a) employ as mllny black players <I S possible in o rder 
to capitalize on their performance. but (b) in order 10 remain under the ceiling. to eliminate 
black players as soon as their performancc declined. lind (c) to retain whi te players of declining 
but similar ability:' 
Research on this topic assumcs that all turnover is invo[ unwry: Kahn (1991) argues that 
the high salaries paid in sports make voluntary quits un likely. Thus. these studies are essentially 
survival models. If white players have longer careers than black players with similar 
performance statistics. then exit discrimination is said to exist. 
3. Data 
Our data include all ind ividuals. both hillers and pitchers. who pa rticipated in M Ul fro m 
1990 through 2004 for a 15-year panel consisting of JI 85 plllyers. 1 Jiobu's (1988) study on exit 
discrimination in baseball only looked at hillers. To capture the O\'crall length of pla yers' 
baseba ll CMecrs. our data consists of bot h stock and flow sa mples. A stock sample consists of 
all ongoing carcers at the start of the panel in 1990. These left-censored daw arc easily included 
because wc know how many ye:lTS each player had played in the major league prior \0 1990. 
I Ikc:IUSC MLB rOSier limilS arc cxp.lndcd from 25 10 40 from Seplember 1 unlillhc end oflhe season. " 'c ehose 10 ignorc 
hiuer obscl"\'alions in which Ihe p!;lyer ~ppearcd in less Ihan 20 games in a scason ~nd pilcher obSi"rvHlions in "'hieh Ihe 
player appeared in less Ih:m six game~ in a season. We wanted 10 limi l Ihe number of players from Ihe sample who 
never Iruly had a carttr in MUl bUI simply made Ihe e~p.lnded rOSier for \WO or Ihl«" seasons. Jiobu (1988) only 
included hiuers in hi s .!-.lmple who appeared in 50 or more games during Iheir careers. 
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Table IA. l'litter Panel Data (1990-2004): Means of Variables 
Van;,b1cs While BI;,ck Foreign.nom Il isp;inics 
Age '9 --- .) 29.82 27.97 
Slugging average 0. 394 0.404 0. 395 
Stolen base percentage 3.70 10.61 6. 17 
Runs baited in per game 0.369 0.386 0.385 
Home runs per g.Hlle 0. 746 0.805 0.804 
Walks per game 0.295 0. 313 0.261 
Strikeouts per game 0.540 0.552 0.549 
Hit by pitch per game 0.028 0.024 0.027 
Sacrifice mes per game 0.026 0.025 0.025 
Runs scored per game 0.378 0.441 0.407 
G;1Il1eS 93.02 102.54 98.52 
Infield 0.397 0.204 0.493 
C:ltcher 0.221 0.016 0.142 
First base 0.125 0.088 0.065 
Primary DH 0.022 0.036 0.027 
Number observations 3795 1621 1462 
Number of players 82 1 283 312 
Our stock sample consists of690 players who had an average tenure of six years as they entered 
the 1990 season. Including a stock sam ple captures information on players whose careers are 
longer than the p.mel data sel. Using only stock data. however, would underrepresent short· 
career players. so we also include fl ow data. 
A flow sample includes all ca reers Ihal start bel ween 1990 and 2004. This sam ple caplures 
man y short ca reers in MLB. Including only flow data, however. would allow for no cu reers 
longer than 15 years. which is the length of our panel. A s with most pancls. our data lire also 
right-censored where many careers were ongoing when our smnple ended in 2004. Our right-
censored data include both stock and flow observat ions. To estimate a duration model of stock 
and fl ow data. we use a technique developed by Berger and l3Iack ( 1998). 
The variables in our data include bot h season-vari.m\ :md season-invarian t d;l!a. Jiobu 
(1988) lIsed only season·invariant d:l!a for his analysis. We report the means in Table IA for 
hitters and Table 1 B for pitchers. Our season-invarian t data include dummy variables for 
player's race; a dummy vari.tble for infielders. first basemen. and calchers: und a dummy 
variable for pitcher's throwing hand.2 Our season ·variant data for hillers arc age. age squared . 
a dummy variable fo r e;lch team's primll ry designated hitter. and performance data that include 
games pl.lyed as well as slugging average. home runs per gitllle, stolen base percclllage. runs 
batted in per game. walks per game. strikeouts per game. hi t by pitch per game. sacrifice mes 
per game. and runs scored per game. Our season-varia n! dat:t for pitchers are age. age squared, 
and performance data th:tt include games played as well as earned run average. wins, losses, 
saves. st rikeout-to-walk ratio. and OUIS in innings pitched. In Tables I A and I B we report 
variilble means by race for hillers and pitchers. respecti vely. To determine if exit discrimination 
exists in the major leagues. we analyze the datil using both nonp<lrametric and scmiparmnetric 
tcchniques. 
~ Thcre l,re ntL"C dummy variables for U.S.·born black players. forci~n·born Hisp;Lnic playcrs. and foreign·born /\ sian 
p!l')"Crs. United Slales-born Hi,p.1ll ic p!:J)"crs arc included in Ihe "hite calcgory. This is the !-arnc appro;,ch used by 
Jiobu. 
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Table I B. Pitcher Panel Data (1990- 2004): Means of Variables 
VanablCll 
Age 
Earned run average 
Wins 
Losses 
Saves 
St rikeout·to-w:llk mtio 
Outs in innings pitched 
Games 
Left-hllndt-d 
Number of observations 
Number of players 
4. Model and Empirica l Results 
whuc 
29.08 
4. 73 1 
4.793 
4.758 
2.316 
1.90J 
256.226 
32.49 
0.311 
5389 
1333 
NOllfJaramelric Esrim(f/eJ of Career D/lralion 
8lack 
28.44 
4.848 
4.789 
4.562 
3.117 
1.723 
248 .789 
34. 17 
0.227 
294 
66 
27.61 
4.775 
4.891 
4.763 
2.834 
1.940 
256.969 
34.08 
0.197 
1008 
238 
To help underst:tnd career duration in ML B. we calculate yearly ha7.a rd functions as 
h, = d,fll,. (I ) 
where (I, is the number of players who end their career in ye;lr I. and "I is the number of players 
at risk of end ing their career in year t. The haZ:lrd r:lle can be interpreted itS the percentage of 
players who exi ted MLB given that they hiwe survived up to some level of tenure. 
Empiri('{l/ Re.wlls 
In Table 2A. we report the haz:trd rate fo r fo reign-born HisPitnic. black. and white hillers. 
and in Table 2B. we report the hazard ra te fo r pitchers by race. In Figures IA and 1 B. we plot 
the hazard functions for hillers and pitchers. respectively. by race. All three plots show that the 
hazard rate gr:ldually declines for the first seven years of tenure in MLB :tnd then gradually 
climbs for the rema inder of the years. In addition. both hazard plots fo llow an interesting 
pa tlern that resembles a U shape. In the engineering litera tu re o n useful life. this haz:ml 
function sha pe has become known as the "bathtub" plol (Bolla 2002). We suggest that this 
pallern also explilins a n MLB career wi th the in ilial downt urn occurring as individ uals arc 
sorted from {he league and the upturn due to a decl ine in ability as players age. 
Cornp:lring the three plo ts shows many crosses. The haZ:lrd plot suggests that the hazard 
r:ttes for black. foreign-born Hispanic. and white players arc similar. Interpreting the 
differences in hazard rates ;IS discrimin:ll ion. however. is misleading. The problem arises for the 
s:mle reason that using differences in median wage is misleading in the wage literature: neither 
method cont ro ls for differences due to productivity. In the next section we analyze ca reer 
dur:tt ion using semi par:lmetric techniques to control for dilTercnces in productivity. 
Semiparalllerric Esrill/ales of Caree/' DunNion 
We estinwte semipilfittlletric hazard functions following Berger and Black (1998). Berger. 
Black. and SCOIl (2004). :md Groothu is and Hill (2004). Because our data are:lt Ihe seasonal 
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Table 2A . Major League Hiner HaZ:lrd Rates 
Tenure While Black I l is~nics 
I 0. IS2 0. 11 5 0.201 
2 0. 130 0.129 0. 142 
3 0.109 0.099 0.129 
4 0 .101 0.070 0.064 
5 0.130 0. 101 0.071 
6 0 .070 0.093 0.069 
7 0.069 0.102 0. 106 
8 0 .151 0.145 0.040 
9 0. 174 0. 13S 0.129 
10 0 .128 0.125 0.080 
II 0 .212 0. 11 8 0.OS7 
12 0.276 0. 11 9 0.1 46 
13 0.247 0.231 0.194 
14 0.375 0.054 0.045 
15 0. 303 0. 194 O. I I I 
16 0.333 0. 207 0.214 
]J 0.375 0.182 0.250 
18 0.308 0.3 16 0.250 
19 0.300 0.182 0 
20 0.7 14 0. 286 
21 0.667 0.400 
22 I 0 
23 0 
24 0 
25 0 
26 I 
b 'cl, we calcula te our haZ<lrd model liS 11 discrete rando m variable. As with Berger, Black, and 
Scott (2004), we modc1the durations of a single spell and assume 11 homogeneous envi ronment 
so that the length of the spell is uncorrelatcd with the calendar time in which the spell begins. 
This assumption lets us trellt all the players' tenure as the same. regardless of when it occurred 
in the panel study. For instance. all fourth year players :I re considered to ha\'e the same bilscline 
haz<trd regardless of calendar time. so a fo unh ye,l r player in 1990 has the same baseline haz:lrd 
as a fo urth year player in 1997. 
To understand how slock data inn uence a likeli hood function. we foll ow the nOlal ion of 
Berger. Black. and Scoll (2004). Suppose the probability mass functio n (pOlf) of durat ions is 
defin l.-d as Jl.t. x. IJ). where f is the durlilion o f the career. x is a \'ector o f perfo rma nce and 
personal characteristics. and IJ is 11 vector of p<lTamelers. Now denote ftf. x. IJ) as the 
cumulative d istributio n functio n: then the probability Ihal a career lasts at least t" yenrs is 
simply I - F(t". x. Il). If we define Ihe hazard fu nction as "(f . . r:. Il) - / (1 . . \'. 13)1S(I. x.IJ). where 
S is the survivor function S(f. x. 13) = n;: : {I - h(i. x. P)I . lllld llpply the definition of 
cond itio nill probabilities. we may express the pmf as 
I, - I 
/ ( /i. Xi. ~) = n [l - " (j. Xi. ~)] " (/i, Xi. ~). 
1_0 
(2) 
If we IUI \'e a sample o f 1/ obscrvillions. \fl, f 2 ... . . f .. l. the likelihood function of the sample is 
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Table 2B. Major Lellgue Pitcher Hazard Rates 
Tenure While Black HisPMics 
I 0.305 0.283 0.236 
2 0.241 0.261 0.246 
3 0.247 0.152 0.219 
4 0.218 0.357 0.185 
5 0.190 0.050 0.168 
6 0.236 0.182 0.257 
7 0.176 0.100 0.158 
8 0.204 0.316 0.245 
9 0.168 0.214 0.350 
10 0.281 0.250 0.357 
II 0.185 0.200 0.263 
12 0.326 0.125 0.357 
13 0.323 0.143 0.400 
14 0.373 0.167 0.429 
15 0.372 0.200 0.250 
16 0.400 0.500 0.667 
17 0.174 0.500 0 
18 0.529 0 
19 0.200 0 
20 0.444 
21 0.400 
22 0.333 
23 0.333 
24 0.500 
25 0 
26 I 
L(PI = n f (I,. x,. PI = n n [I - " (J. x,. P)["(I,. x,. PI . ""(H )
; .. 1 i .. 1 j _ 1 
(3) 
Oftcn it is not possible to observe all careers until they end. henee c:lreers are often right-
censored. Lei set A be the SCI of all observ:Hions where Ihe pl:l yers' careers are complcted. and 
let set H be the sct of all observations where Ihe careers are righi-censored. For Ihe sel o f right-
censored observations. all we know is that the actual length of the career is greater than f,. the 
observed length of thc career up through the last year. Because we know that the actu<lllength 
of the CllTcer is longer than we observe. then the cont ribut ion of these observlllions to the 
likelihood function is just the survivor function (S). 
To introduce stock sampli ng. let sct C be the sel of careers that were in progress whcn d<lt<l 
collection began. For these observations. we know thaI career i has lasted for r years before thc 
panel begins so the likeli hood must be adjusted by Ihe conditional probability of the career 
having length r. Of course. some stock-sampled observ<lIions may be right-censored. Let set I) 
be the set of all stock-sampled observations that are also right·censored. An example of a c:treer 
thai is both right- and left-censored would be a player Ihal starts his career prior 10 1990 and 
ends his cureer after 2004. Tllking inlo account all fOUf sels-A. 8. C. iLnd I)- the likelihood 
function becomes 
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Figure 1A. H:I ~Md R;!(cs for Major League Hiners 
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In Equa tion 4. the contribution of censored, stock-sampled observations to the likelihood 
function is strictly from Ihe la st IWO terms: such observations simply provide infonmltion about 
the survivor functio n between (r. I ). 
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Thus we. like Berger. Black. and ScOIl (2004). have expressed the likelihood function :IS:l 
function of the hazard functions. All th:1t remains is to specify the fo rm of a hazard function 
and estimate by means of m:lximum likelihood est imation. Bec,IUse the haz:lrd fu nct ion is the 
conditional probability of exiting M LB given that the M LB career lasted until the previous 
season. the hazard funct ion must have a range fro m 0 to 1. In principle, any mapping with a 
mngc from 0 to I will work . Cox (1972) rccommends 
h(/. x. ~) 
I - " (I. X. ~) 
h' l (AI = cxp(y, + xP). 
I - I, 
(5) 
which is simply the logit model with intcrcepts that differ by period . The term h, is a baselinc hm~.'lrd 
function. which is common to all. Thc xp teml. determined by the player's personal and productivity 
characteristics. shifts the baseline hazard function. but it affects thc baselinc hazard function in 
eX:lctly the same way e:lch period. Berger and Black (J 998) consider other haZ:lTd functions :md lind 
that Ihe results are relatively robust across various specifications of the hazard function. Because the 
logit model is :lvailable in m:lny software packages, we follow Cox and use the logit modeL 
The intuition behind Equat ion 5. when using the logit model for the hazard func tion. is 
relatively simple. For each year during the survey in which the player is in M LB. the pl:lyer 
either comes back for anolher season or ends his career. If Ihe career ends. Ihe dependent 
varinble tnkes on a value of I: otherwise. Ihe dependent variable is O. The player remains in the 
panel until the player exits M LB or the panel ends. If thc panel ends. we say the worker's spell is 
right-censored. Thus. a player who begins his M LB career du ring the panel and pl:lYs for six 
years will enter the data sel six times: The value of his dependent variable will be 0 for the first 
five yellrs (tenure one through five) and be equal to I fo r the sixth year. 
To illustra te a stock sample. consider anOl her player who enlers Ihe panel wilh seven yea rs 
of M LB job tenu re prior to 1990, the first YC:lr of the panel. thcn plays for an additional thrce 
years for a lO-year career. For this playcr. we ignore his first seven years of tenure because he is 
left-censored. As the equation of Ihe li kelihood function with stock data indicates, the duralion 
of a M LB ca reer prior to the beginning of Ihe panel makes no cont ribution to the vlllue of the 
likelihood function . Therefore. only ye:l rs 8 through 10 will elller the data sct with the 
dependenl variable taking on the value 0 for years eight and nine lind in the tenth year it takes 
on a value of I with this player appearing in the daw set a total of three times. Note for all 
p];lyers who :Ire right-censored. we do not know when their career ends so their dependent 
v:l riables are always coded :IS O. 
Because thc players in the p.lncl have varying degrces of job tenure prior to the begin ning 
of the panel, we identify the haZ:lTd fu nction for both long and short careers. The disadvantage 
to this approach is Ihat thc vector y, of Equation 5 can be very 11Irgc. In our study il would 
require 25 dummy variables. We also run into problems wilh Ihe Cox technique because we 
have too few players who have long ca reers. To simpl ify the compu\lIt ion of the likelihood 
fu nct ion and be able to keep the long careers. we simply approximate the y, veclor with a fifth 
order polynomial of the players' tenure in MLB. which reduces the number of parameters 10 be 
estimated from 25 to 5. Th us. the haZllrd function becomes 
(6) 
where cj>(1) is a fifth order polynomi:ll of Ihe pla yer's tenure in M LB. The fifth order polynomial 
therefore includes tenure to the first, second. thi rd. fourth. and fifth powers. Once again. we 
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Table 3". '·Iitter C lrccr Duration Semiparamctric Analysis (1990- 2004) 
Constant 
Hlack 
Foreign-born Hispanic 
Asia n-born pl.l yers 
Agc 
Age squared 
Slugging avcmge 
Stolen base percentage 
Homc runs per g.ulle 
Runs battcd in per game 
Walks per gamc 
Strikeouts per game 
Hit by pitch per gamc 
Sacrificc nics per game 
Runs scorcd per game 
Games 
Infield 
First base 
Catchcr 
Pri mary DH , 
X-
Number o bservations 
Muhinomial Logi ~ 1-.1odcl 
- 8.900 (3.87) 
- 0.191 (1.65) 
0.054 (0.57) 
- 0.967 (0.84) 
0.603 (3.86) 
- 0.007 (2.72) 
- 2335 (3.6 1) 
- O.oJ8 (3.1 4) 
- 1.485 (4.50) 
- 1.158 (2.21) 
- 0.243 (0.61) 
0.889 (3 .86) 
- 1. 243 ( 1.58) 
1.1 06 (0.50) 
- 1.492 (2.63) 
- O.ol8 ( 11 .77) 
- 0.374 (3.69) 
-0. 113 (0.74) 
- 0.902 (6.78) 
0.247 (0.92) 
1611.77 
7210 
Firs~ ~hrough fiflh order ~"nurc polynomi;tls arc ,tlso inciu()cd ~o pro"i()e for gencral func~ion,ll form of baseline 
hazar(); lhe}" arc joinll} $ignif,c'111 1. The numbers in pa rentheses ,He ,1bsolule value of I·ra~ios. 
choose the Taylo r series approximation tcchnique ovcr using tenure dummics because of the 
small number of observations fo r high ten ures. T his method providcs a vcry nexiblc 
specificatio n of the baseline hazard but does impose marc res trictions than Cox's modc1.J 
Empirical Re.wlrsJor Hillers 
In Tablc 3A. we report the estimates for hitters for Equat ion 6: in Table 4A. we report the 
cstimates for hittcrs fo r Equa tion 6 by race. In Table SA. we report the estimates for hitters by 
racc broken down into smaller time increments. 
Per{Q /"II/(III CC SIU/i.I·lio· 
I n our model of exit. we suggest that improvcments in performance should increase carcer 
length: owncrs will keep players who arc more productive. The results from Table 3A fi rmly 
support this hypothesis. An increase in slugging a vcrage. hOl11e runs per gamc. runs batted in 
pcr game. runs scored per game. stolcn base percentagc. and games played all lead to a decrease 
in the probability of exit. Coe1Ticiellls for all these v<lriables are properly signed .lIld significalll 
at the 5% or I % level. Obviously Ihere is a high degree of correlatio n between home runs. runs 
batted in. runs scored, and slugging aver;lge; however. each variable captures a slightly different 
, When higher order pol}nomi"ls or the SiXlh "nd "",,,mh po""r arc inc1ud~-d . Ihe rcsuhs do not chang". suggesting thaI 
~ fiflh order polynon1l:,1 is ncxib1c enough to "'"plllrc lhe intlucncc of ~hc baS<""linc hazard . 
• 
584 P('fer A. GruOlllllis Wit/ hum's Rid"mllfill 
TaM£' 3B. I)itcher Career Duration Scmiparamctric Analysis (1990-2004) 
Variable 
Constant 
Black 
Foreign-born H ispanic 
Asian-bo rn players 
Age 
Age squared 
Earned run :lvcr:lge 
Wins 
Losses 
Savcs 
Slrikeout-to-wal k ra tio 
Outs in innings pi tched 
Games 
Left-handed , 
Z-
Number obscrvations 
Multinomial Logil MO<.Id 
- 8.74 (4. 37) 
0.059 (0.32) 
- 0.2 13 (1.86) 
- 0.227 (0.64) 
0.446 (3.24) 
- 0.004 (2.03) 
0.121 (6.50) 
- 0.147 (5.60) 
0.077 (3 .36) 
- 0.048 (4.15) 
- 0.350 (6.82) 
- 0.0037 (4. 50) 
- 0.018 (6.82) 
- 0.173 (2.15) 
1459.50 
6956 
Firsl lhrough firth order lenure polynomials arc also includcd 10 pro' ide for general functional form of baseline 
hazard: they are joinlly significanl. The numbers in parentheses are absolule "alue of I-ratios. 
aspecl of offensive performance. It is interest ing 10 note Ihat home runs per gmne has the 
highest I-value of these variables: Ihis is nol surprising given Ihe media al\enlio n focused on 
home runs. An increase in strikeouts per ga me leads to:m increase in exit: the coefficient of this 
variable is also significant at the I % level. The coefficients of walks per game and hit by pitch 
per game are properly signed but not signi ficant: the coefficient of s,\crifice nics per game is 
improperly signed but not significant. 
Table 4A . Hitter Career Duration Semip;mullct ric Ana lysis by Race (1990- 2004) 
Variable 
Constant 
Ag' 
Age squared 
Slugging .tverage 
Stolen b'lsc percentage 
Home ru ns per gllll1e 
R uns baited in per g:lll1e 
Wa lks per game 
Stri keo uts per game 
Hit by pitch per game 
Sacrifice flie s per ga mc 
R uns scorcd per ga me 
Games 
Infield 
First basc 
Ca tcher 
Primary DH , 
r: 
Number of observations 
Logi l Model While 
- 11.61 (3.27) 
0.774 (3.26) 
- 0.010 (2.46) 
- 2.853 (3.27) 
- O.oJ5 (1.74) 
- 1.632 (3.70) 
- 0. 142 (0.20) 
-0.506 (0.94) 
0.587 (1.92) 
-0.1 41 (0.07) 
0.486 (0.17) 
- 1.2 1 (1.60) 
- 0.019 (9.67) 
- 0.504 (3.67) 
- 0. 104 (0.70) 
- 1.04 (6.30) 
0.754(2.11) 
894 ,84 
3795 
Logit 1-. IO<.Icl Black 
- 9.89 (5.88) 
0.575 (1.45) 
- 0.006 (1.0 1) 
-0.887 (0.65) 
- 0.054 (2.63) 
- 0.969 (00.94) 
- 3.78 (3.23) 
0.039 (0.04) 
1.439 (2.62) 
- 1.87 (0.44) 
03 (0.84) 
-2.54 (1.94) 
- 0.016 (4.40) 
- 0.181 (0.75) 
- 0.563 ( 1.49) 
- 0.583 (0.93) 
- 0.79 (O.1 4) 
409.38 
1621 
Logi l MO<.Icl Foreign- llorn tt ispanic 
- 10.68 (2.32) 
0.771 (2.37) 
- 0.010 (1.79) 
- 3.430 (2.17) 
- 0.036 (0.82) 
- 1.46 (1.92) 
- 1.01 (0.82) 
0.073 (0.07) 
0.404 (0.74) 
- 0.631 (0.17) 
- 0.680 (0. 13) 
- 0.609 (0.46) 
- 0.021 (5.59) 
- 0.449 (1.94) 
- 1.10(0.78) 
- 1.10(3.35) 
- 0.224 (0.28) 
308.02 
1462 
Firsl through fifth order tcnurc polynomials arc also includl-d to pro"idc for general rllnctional rorm or baseline 
hal~ud: Ihey are jointly significanl. The numbers in parentheses ~rt absolute "alut or I·ratios 
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Table 411, Pitcher Career Durat ion Semi parametric Analysis by Race (1990- 2004) 
Variable I..ogil /T. todel While Logil Model libel.: I..ogil ~ todd Foreign·Born Hisp.1l1ic 
Constant - 7.82 (3.39) ~13. 1 5 (0.82) ~ 10.59 (2.21) 
Age 0.375 (2.37) 0.700 (0.60) 0.5S8 (1.74) 
Age squared - 0.003 (1.33) 0.004 (0.22) 0.008 (1.35) 
Ea rned run average 0.135 (6.28) 0.064 (0. 56) 0.083 (1.90) 
Wins ~0.157 (5.3 1) -0.274 (1.96) - 0.079 (1.01) 
Losses 0.080 (3.12) 0. 134 (1.07) 0.082 (1,25) 
Saves - 0.048 (3.60) - 0.028 (0.72) - 0.Q78 (1.82) 
Slri keouHo-wa lk ratio - 0.336 (5.96) 0.061 (0.18) - 0.557 (3.33) 
Outs in innings pitched - 0.004 (4.16) - 0.002 (0.61) - 0.005 (1.84) 
Games - 0.016 (5.45) -0.029 (2.00) - 0.016 (2.05) 
Left-handed - 0.156 (1.76) - 0.339 (0.68) - 0.214 (0.82) , 
1174.32 83.62 108.51 ,-
Number observalions 5389 294 100S 
First Ihrough finh order lemm: polynomials arc also included 10 pro\'idc for general funclional form of baseline 
hat;1rd: lhey arejoimly signilicanl. Thc numbers in parentheses arc absolute v~luc of I·ratios. 
Racl' 
In our model of exit. we :l lso suggesl thai raee may play a role if white customers have a 
preference 10 sec white players and if te:mlS lind it difficull to replace white players. Only the 
coeffi cient fo r foreign-born Hisp:mie players is positive. meaning this allribute increases the 
probability of exi t for the period. but the coefficient is nO( signilica nt. The coefficients for the 
Table SA. Hiller Career Durat ion Semi parametric Analysis by Period 
Variable I..ogil Model 1990 1995 Logi! Modd 1995 1000 Logit Model 2000-2004 
Constant - 13.040(2.79) - 5.70 (1.43) - 3. 18 (0.90) 
Black - .220 (1.17) - 0.098 (0.54) -0.222 (1.08) 
Foreign-born Hispanic 0.291 (1.56) 0.041 (0.24) - 0.044 (0.26) 
Foreign-born Asiana - - - 0.711 (0.63) 
Age 0.883 (2.98) 0.342 (1.24) 0.216 (0.91 ) 
Age squared - 0.0 10 (2.06) - 0.002 (0.45) - 0.002 (0.45) 
Slugging average - 2.96 (2.65) - 1.79 (1.77) - 1.69 (1.65) 
Stolen base percentage - 0.062 (2.78) - 0.068 (3.11) - 0.011 (0.56) 
Homc runs per game - 1.215 (2.19) - 1.698 (3.27) -1.654 (2.98) 
Runs batted in per gllme - 1.425 (1.57) - 1.022 (1.29) -0.714 (0.82) 
WlIlks per gllme - 0.499 (0.75) - 0.099 (0.03) 0.355 (0.52) 
Strikcouts per game 0.787 (1.98) 1.01 (2.79) 0.978 (32.53) 
Hit by pitch per game - 1.77 (0.54) - 2.58 (1.04) -1.07 (0.45) 
Sacrifice nies per game 0. 105 (0.03) 2.36 (0.69) -8.74 (0.2 3) 
Runs scored per gllllle - 2.48 (2.57) - 1.11(1.22) -1.56 (1.66) 
Games - 0.019 (6.95) - 0.019 (S.05) - 0.0 15 (6.52) 
Infield - 0.593 (3.39) - 0.277 (1.75) - 0.190 (1.16) 
First base 0.382 (1.56) - 0.335 (1.31) -0.256 (1.04) 
C:ltcher - 1.14 (5.17) - 0.894 (4.18) - 0.675 (3.06) 
Primary DI-l 0.273 (0.61) 0115(0.26) 0.369 (0.84) , 
755.68 705.63 446.03 ,. 
Number observalions 2727 2937 2533 
Firsl lhrough linh ordcr lenure polynomials ~re also included 10 pro'· ide for general functional form of baseline 
ha7.:lrd: Ihcy arc joimly signific:ml. The numbers in paren!ht"SCS are abrolute \'alue of ,·ratios 
• No foreign·horn t\si~ns "'cre in the league in the t990 t995 and 1995-2000 periods. 
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TaMc 58. Pitcher Carcer Duration Scmi paramclric An .. lysis by Period 
Variable Lo!;i. ModeJ 1990 1995 Logit ~ I odcl 1995 2000 Logit ModeJ 2000 lQO.l 
Constant - IOAI (2.69) - 10.2 1 (3.21) - 6.18 (2.25) 
Black - 0.042 (0. 13) 0.1 76 (0.65) 0.305 (1.08) 
Foreign-born Hispanic - 0.1 06 (0.46) - 0.169 (0.96) - 0.2 10 ( 1.37) 
Fo reign-born Asian" - 0.281 (0.75) 
Age 0.552 (2.07) 0,451 (2.08) 0.89 (1.52) 
Age squ:lred - 0.006 (1.26) - 0.004 (1.24) - 0.002 (0.79) 
Earned run average 0.179 (5.24) 0.167 (5.59) 0.078 (3.02) 
Wins - 0.186 (4. 20) - 0.074 (1.78) - 0.147 (3.76) 
Losses - 0.009 (0.230) 0.111 (3.04) 0.125 (3 .69) 
Saves - 0.096 (3.96) - 0.067 (3.63) - 0.021 (1.43) 
Strikeout- to-wal k rat io - 0.609 (5.78) -0.317 (4.00) - 0.2 19 (3.28) 
Outs in innings pitched - 0.002 (1 .57) - 0.007 (5. 2( ) - 0.004 (3.29) 
Games - 0.004 (2.09) - 0.007 (2.02) - 0.028 (7.06) 
Len-handed - 0.507 (3.67) - 0.045 (0.35) - 0.028 (0.2 3) , 
596.12 684.69 624 .51 [ 
Number o f observlltions 2483 2881 3069 
First through fift h order tcnur;, pot} nomials are ,lIso included to pro"ide for general functiona l form of baseline 
ha7.artl: they arC jointl)' significant. The numocrs in p:lrenth= arc absolute value of ,·ra tios. 
~ No for<,ign·born As'"ns in our pancl c.~i.ro MLB in the 1990 1995 anti 1995 2000 periods. 
o ther race dummy variables arc negati ve. indicating members of these groups have lower 
probability of exit. but both coefficients arc all insignilicant. 
To convert the coefficient into a percentage and focus on the magnitude of the effect. we 
usc 100[exp(~) - I] . T his conversion gives us the percentage difference in hazlird rates between 
whites and blacks. between whites and fo reign-born Hispanics. and between whites and foreign-
born AsillllS. We lind tha t black hillers Iwve a 17% lower hazlITd rate than white hiuers. while 
fo reign-born Hispllnic hiuers have a 5.5% higher hazard rate th:tn whites. Asi:tn-born hillers. a 
very small percentage of the sample. have a 62% lower hazard nlle than white hillers. Aga in. 
nom: of the resu lts is statisticillly signilieant. 
To examine the role of race and dura tion more fu lly. we estimated the mooel separatel y for 
white. black. and foreign-born Hispanic players: the sample size of Asillll-born players was too 
small to allow for separate estimation. These estimations. shown in Table 4A. indicate simi lar 
rcsults for the thrce race models. Unfortunately the interaction of correlation between variables 
a nd decreased sample size has caused some o ffensive variables 10 become insignificant. These 
results do no t indicate any differential treatment between the races based on performance 
slatistics in general over the pcriod.4 
Estimations o f the overall hiuer model by smaller time spans arc shown in Table 5A. The 
coefficient of foreign-born Hispanic is positivc but not significant in the fi rst period (1990-
1995). positive and insignificant in the second period (1995- 2000). and negative and 
insignificant in the last period (2000- 2004), In the first period only (6% of the slIIllple is 
fo reign -born Hispanic: this rises to 19% in the second period and 25% in thc third period. The 
coefficient fo r black players is negative and insignificant in all three periods: the coefficient fo r 
fo reign-born Asian hiuers is neg:lli ve and insignificant in the o nly period run. 
~ The /acr·spccilic regrco;sion$ " 'cre alro run using only slugging a,er..g<' to ~':IPtUrc olTerl);"c pcrrommncr. In these 
models Ihe sign and m:tgnitude of slugging awragc ar;, "cry similar for eaeh race. These results art' ''''ailable on requ<'sl 
rrom the authors. 
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Teflllre (II1f1 Age 
In Table 3A. we find that the tenure polynomials. not sho wn. arc join tly significant. Exit 
probability rises significantly wilh pl:lyer age: however. the coefficient of age squared is 
negative :lIld significan t. The signs of these variables do not change in the smaller sa mple size 
regressions in Table 4 (by race) and Table 5 (by smaller periods). but the coefficients li re not 
always significant. 
Position 
Results in Table 3A indicate both infielders and clltchers enjoy longer playing careers. 
ceteris parihll.v. than outfielders (excluded category) and fi rst basemen. T his is not surprising 
because these positions are viewed as more defensive in nature; whereas. first basemen and 
outfielders are genera lly viewed as mo re offensive positio ns and offensive contributions arc 
already captured by the performance st:ltistics included in the model. In the regression results of 
the models run for the separate nlCCS. shown in Table 4A. the coefficients fo r infield and catcher 
are again negative and significant for white and foreign·born Hispanics: the coefficients are 
properly signed but insignificant in the black model. The vast majo rity o f black hillers are 
outfielders: only 20.4% of the black sample were infielders. The use o f the designated hiller (D H) 
in the Americllll League is o ften s:lid to extend the career o f aging sluggers who lire no longer able 
to pcrfoml adequately in the field. The coeffi cient o f primary DH is not significant in the overall 
model shown in Table 3A nor in the models run for shorter periods shown in Table 5A; in the 
regressions broken down by race. shown in Table 4A. thc coefficient of primary DH is positive 
and signific:lllt in the white model only: the coefficients of primary DH Me negative but 
insignificant in the black and foreign·born Hispanic models. Data from positional chllrts of 
American League teams fo r each season indicated that 40% of the DH positions were oecupied by 
white hillers (58% of the hillers in the overall sample are white). 33% by black hillers (20% of the 
hillers in the overall sample arc black). and 20% by foreign·born Hispllnic hillers (22% o f the 
overall hiuer sample arc foreign-bo rn Hispanics). I n many cases the same player occupied the DH 
position for multiple seasons. The percentage of black DH s is greater than the percentage of blllck 
hiners in our sa mple; however. the black hitters have better offcnsivc perfonnancc statistics o n 
average than white hillers. so this is to be expectcd. 
Comparisoll (0 liobu 's Results 
Jio bu found evidence o f exit discrimination agllinst black hiuers but not Hispa nic hillers. 
We find no evidence of exit discrimination against black hillers. but there is evidence of exit 
discriminat ion agai nst foreign·born Hispanic hittcrs in the early years (1990-2000) of our sample 
that disappears by the end of our samplc period (2000- 2004). Several explanations for the 
difference in results c:m be posited. First . our data cover 11 more recent period. Perhaps 
competitive m:lrket forees have removed the last vestige o f discrimination against black hillers 
from M Lil Second. while our econometric technique is similar in nature to that of Jiobu, he used 
only ca reer performance stat istics. None of his data varied between seasons. Therefore. his 
finding of exit discrimination rests solely o n the higher average ca reer perfo rmance statist ics of 
blllck hillers versus white and Hispanic hillers a nd the average duration of each race. Jiobu finds 
longer career length on average fo r black hitters but finds a posit ive a nd significant coefficient for 
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his black d ummy variable in the duration analysis. This would seem a foregone conclusion given 
thei r higher average career statis tics and longer career lengths. Our model has yearly performance 
statistics that allow the duration analysis to adjust for the '·decay rate·' of hitter skills. 
Empiric(ll ResullS fo r Pinlters 
[n Tablc 3B. we report the estimates for pi tchers for Equa tion 6: in Table 48 . we report 
the estima tes for pi tchers for Equation 6 by race. In Table 58 . we report the estinwtes for 
pitchers by race broken down into smaller time incremcnts. 
Performance Suuisrics 
The coeffi cients of all o f the performance measures in Table 3B a re properly signed and 
significa nt determinants of cllreer durat ion. I ncreases in earned run average lind losses increase the 
probabili ty of e:<it while increases in wins. Sllves, st rikeout-to-walk ratio. outs in innings pitched. 
and games played decrease the probability of e:<it. All coefficients are significalll at the 1'70 level. 
Race 
Results for the race coefficients are perpJe:<ing. Thc coefficient for the bllick dummy is 
posi tive but insignificant: the coefficient for Asian-born players is negative but insignificant: the 
coeffi cients for foreign-bo rn Hispanics are negative and significant at the 10% lcvel. This 
stat istical lI llomaly is hard to explain: Hispanic pitchers havc longer Cllreer lengths than 
wa rranted by their perfo rmance statistics. 
Once again . \ 0 convert the coefficient into 11 percentage and focus on the magnitude of the 
effect. we use lOO[e:<p(l}) - I]. Th is conversion gives us the percenl<tge dilTerence in hazard rates 
between whites a nd black. Here we find that black pitchers have a 6% higher hazlird rate tlHII1 
whiles: lI llhough. i1 is insignificant. On the other ha nd. fo reign-born Hispmlic pitchcrs have 
lowcr hazard rates than whi te pitchers. Foreign-born Hispanic pitchers have a 19% lower 
hazard rate: the difference is statistically significa nt at the 5% level. Asian-born pitchers. a very 
sma ll percentage of the sample. have a 20% lower hazard mte than whi te pitchers. but this 
d ifference is not statis tically sign ificant. 
As was done for hi tters. we estimated the model sepa mtely for white. black. :uld foreign-
born Hispanic pitchers: the sample size of Asian-born pitchers WllS too small to allow for 
sepa ra te estimation. These regressions. shown in Table 48. indicate simi1:lr results for the three 
race categories. The signs of all pitching va riable cocffi cients are the Slime in the th ree race 
models e:<cept fo r st rikeout-to-wa lk ra tio in the black model. It is posi tive instead of negat ive 
but insignifi cant. Some o f the coefficien ts of the perfo rmance varill bles in the black and fore ign-
bo rn Hispan ic speci fi cations of the model a re insignificant. possibly due to the smaller sample 
size. Coeffi cients fo r the other variables (age. lIge squared . and left-handed) arc properly signed 
but not significant in many cases. These results do not indicllte any different ial treatment 
between the races in general over the period. 
Estimations of the overall pi tcher model by smaller time spans. shown in T:lble SA. fail to 
confi rm the evidence of exit discrimination in favor o f Hispanic pitchers in any of the smaller 
time spans. The coefficients arc a ll negative. but none is significant. The coefficient for blllCk 
pi tchers is also negative fo r the firs t period but not significant. The coenicient for black pitchers 
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is posit ive in Ihe laHcr IWO periods bUI not significant. Givcn thc lack of robustness in these 
findings. it is difficult 10 conclude that Hispanic pilchers were given favorable trealment. 
Tellure mlf/ Ag(' 
Exil probability rises with player agc but decreases with age squHrcd. The signs of the 
coefficicnts of these va ri:lbles rcmain the SHme in all regressions but lack sign ificance in the 
smallcr S:lmple size v:tri.Hions. Thc tenure polynomials. not shown in the table. are joint ly 
significant again in all specifications of thc model. 
L(1t-H(lI1(/('(/ 
Len-handed pitchers appear to enjoy longer careers. ct'teris p(lriblls. than right-handcrs. 
Thc sign of thc coefficicnt of Icn-handcd is negat ive in all s(X.'Cificat ions of the model and is 
significant OIl the 5% Icvel in the general model (Table 313). :ttthe 1% level in the 1990- 1995 
period (T'lble 513). and at the 10% Icvel in the white model (Table 413); it is not signi fiC:lI1t in 
othcr specifications of the model. Givcn the small percentage of the population that is lert-
handed :lI1d the lowcr baiting averagc orlert-handed bailers against left-handed pitchers. it has 
been noted by b.tscb:tll pundits that len-handed pitchers do not ha\'e to be as good as right-
handers to earn a roster spot in M LI3. 
5. Conclusion 
Ovcra ll in our semiparamclric duration analysis. we find that perfonnance variables are 
important in detcnnining career length. Our results for pitchers do not indicate lilly exit 
discrimination ag:tinst the minority groups. We find thc :tnomalous result that fo reign-born 
Hispanic pitchers have longer e:treer lengths than warranted by their perfonnance statistics. This 
finding is somewhat tenuous at best: the coefficient is on ly signific:tnt at the 10% lcvel in the 
ovcmll smnple and does not appear at any significant levels in thc smallcr time span breakdowns. 
Past rCSC:lrch suggested that discrimination by majority whitc f:lIls led owners in sports to 
keep Icss talentcd whitc players on rostcrs. Our findings arc inconsistcnt wit h results from a st udy 
by Jiobu (1988) in <l promincnt sociology journal (Socia/ Forces) using 1971- 1985 data that fou nd 
that race dccrellscd c<lreer length. CI'Il'ri.~ ptlribus. for black hitters but not foreign-born Hisp;mics. 
We lind no cvidence th.1I race aIYects the cilrccr duration of black or fo reign-born Hispan ic hillers. 
Our methodology allows the duration analysis to adjust for the "decay r:lIe" of hitter skills. It is 
illll>ossibic to dClcnnine if the diIYerence in our findings is the result of our newer data sct or usc of 
ye:t rly mther than career pcrfonnance statistics. Our rcsults could be intcrpreted as an affirmation 
of Ilcckc(s theorctical impliC<ltions of market competi tion ovcrcoming discrimin:ttion. 
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